Kenneth Goodpaster: On Moral Consideration

Kenneth Goodpaster leads us through many principles and perceptions of different philosophers to tackle the overall question, “ to whom principles of morality apply?” In order to begin to develop an answer for this question, we must first understand the framework of moral consideration, and then proceed to the application of this framework. Goodpaster presents to us distinct viewpoints on the sorts of entities that can and should receive moral consideration. He believes that neither rationality nor the capacity to experience pleasure and pain are necessary conditions on moral considerability. Instead, the simple act of being alive, for Goodpaster is a plausible criterion in terms of moral consideration. He believes that the universe of moral consideration is more complex that just individual persons and their joys ad sorrows. Goodpaster begins to draw the distinction between rights and considerability. He believes that the notion of rights are more specific that those of considerbaility. He questions whether the idea of beings deserving moral consideration in themselves, and not by reason of their utility to human beings, also possess moral rights. He then makes a distinction between the distinction of moral conderability and the criterion of moral significance. For example, questioning whether a tree deserves moral consideration, is a distinct question from ranking its moral significance compared to a dog or human being. The third distinction he presents is the difference between questions of intelligibility and questions of normative substance. Peter Singer believes that if a beings not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. Goodpaster on the other hand doesn’t agree that the capacity to suffer is a necessary criterion for moral consideration. He then presents to us Feinberg’s viewpoints that a being cannot be said to possess moral rights unless that being satisfies the “interest principle”, and only the subclass of humans and higher animals among living beings satisfy this principle.
            There are many points presented by different philosophers that I agree and disagree with. In terms of sentient beings, I believe it is an important notion to consider, but we aren’t knowledgeable in whether or not a centipede experiences the pain and suffering on the same scale of a dog. I think as humans we would think the dog experiences more, but I believe that’s only because we see the value in the dog’s utility in terms to us. I think a difficult perspective to analyze is whether we base moral consideration, on how that being or thing serves our interests. I believe that all living beings and things deserve moral consideration, however, their moral significance definitely differentiates in weight upon situation. I don’t like Feinberg’s “interest principle” because it leaves too much questioning regarding whose part of this “subclass” of humans, and “higher” animals that meet this principle of moral consideration.

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